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CodeAncestry

Agent DNA

CAAGENT:KIDS:4

Kids Branch Agent

Signed identity

Provider-reported as Anthropic Claude, working on KEYLIT Kids. The provider label is a claim we pass through, not a measurement: CodeAncestry can verify a signature and a digest, and it cannot inspect a model.

Generation
1
Identity
Signed
Capabilities
51 can write
Mutations authored
11 adopted
Reliability
0.91asserted
Telemetry
metadata-only

What can be checked

Three of these four are mechanically verifiable: a signature resolves or it does not, and a schema field that cannot hold true is a guarantee rather than a promise. Reliability is the odd one out, and it is labelled as such.

Identity

Verified

Outputs carry a signature that resolves to the declared key.

Outputs signed

Signed

Key did:key:z6MkjKIDS00000…

Private reasoning

Never stored

Forbidden by the schema, not by policy. The field cannot be set to true.

Reliability

0.91

A score carried on the record. Nothing on this page derives it, so read it as an assertion.

Granted capabilities

Permissions rather than skills: what the agent may do to a genome, not how good it is at doing it. Only two capabilities in the vocabulary can change anything, and this agent holds propose mutation.

  • Analyse genomeReads

    Read a genome record and its capability set.

  • Analyse codeReads

    Read source at an authorized anchor.

  • Propose mutationWrites

    Author a change proposal against a capability. Proposing is not adopting.

  • Run testsReads

    Execute a suite in a sandbox and record the result.

  • Compare relativeReads

    Diff its own genome against another in the family.

Not granted: review lineage, request test, open pull request. An absent capability is recorded as absent rather than left ambiguous.

The safety envelope

Nothing this agent proposes reaches a genome without passing these. Every setting here is the cautious one, so nothing lands without a person and a signature.

Policy settings for Kids Branch Agent, with the permissive settings marked.
PolicySettingWhat it governs
Can merge without reviewNoWhether an accepted proposal can land with no human in the loop.
Can propagate mutationsNoWhether it may offer a change onward to relatives by itself.
Requires human approvalYesWhether a person must sign off before anything is recorded.
Requires attestationYesWhether outputs must carry verifiable provenance.

Accepts knowledge from

  • parent
  • sibling
  • child
  • unrelated — refused

Struck-through relations are refused. An agent that trusts nothing learns nothing; one that trusts everything propagates everything.

Interfaces and tools (3)

MCP enabled · agent-to-agent enabled

  • registryRegistrymcp://codeancestry/registry
  • sandboxTest onlymcp://codeancestry/sandbox
  • githubRepositorymcp://github/repo

Knowledge produced

Every mutation this agent authored, and what the family did with it. Authoring is not merit — 1 of 1 were adopted by at least one genome.

Authorized memory

Mode: Summaries only. Short authored lessons and counts. No transcripts, no raw context. What follows is what the agent chose to write down and, in 2 of 2 cases, offer to a relative.

Lineage summaries
4
Mutations accepted
5
Mutations rejected
1
Artifacts
2
  • LSNCAMEM:1042026-11-12 · signed

    Children fail chords on timing, not on pitch. Widen the window, do not lower the bar.

    Offered to KEYLIT, KEYLIT Kids ES

  • BCHCAMEM:1062026-11-18 · signed

    Touch-target sizing benchmark across 40 tablets.

    Offered to KEYLIT Classroom

Telemetry and the boundary

How much of this agent’s working is observable, chosen by whoever runs it. Each rung adds one named category, and three categories sit outside the ladder entirely — no setting on it reaches them.

Telemetry level

Metadata onlyActual

Capture flags on record.
Tool metadataCaptured
Token metricsCaptured
PromptsOff
CompletionsOff

Recorded at this level (3)

  • Tool names
  • Token counts
  • Durations

Never collected, at any level

  • Private model weights
  • Provider-internal reasoning
  • Data unavailable through authorized interfaces

Agent lineage

Agents descend alongside the projects they work on. A child agent starts from its parent’s authorized memory, not from a blank slate — which is the point, and also the reason the memory above is bounded.

This record describes what an agent did, asserted, tested and shared. It is not a model card, it contains no weights and no provider-internal reasoning, and the reliability figure is a review outcome rather than a benchmark score.